Оценка эффективности экономических санкций: возможности систематического анализа
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17059/ekon.reg.2021-2-1Ключевые слова:
экономические санкции, эффективность, систематический обзор, базовая выборка, релевантная выборка, целевые санкции, комплексные санкции, региональные соглашения, издержки, политический режим, сравнительный анализАннотация
В 2014 г. страны Европейского союза, США и ряд других государств ввели экономические санкции против России. Для противодействия санкциям необходимо понимать условия их эффективности. Цель данного исследования заключается в установлении факторов, влияющих на эффективность экономических санкций, на основании анализа научной литературы по проблематике санкций как инструмента трансформации политики отдельных стран. Использована методология систематического обзора литературы, которая, в соответствии с целью исследования, включает следующие этапы: 1) определение базовой выборки публикаций как результата поиска по ключевым словам в базах данных Web of Science, Scopus, РИНЦ, SSRN, EBSCO, Ideas RePec, Google Scholar, издательствах Cambridge University Press, Routledge, De Gruyter JSTOR, Springer, Taylor & Francis, 2) определение релевантной выборки на основании разработанных авторами критериев, включающих тип публикации, язык, характер, содержание и контекст, 3) синтез публикаций релевантной выборки, 4) формирование общих выводов, полученных по результатам исследования. Для представления результатов использованы методы сравнительного анализа и графического анализа. Изучение ключевых исследований позволяет сделать вывод, что экономические санкции более эффективны в достижении своих целей при следующих условиях: 1) санкционные издержки для страны-мишени выше, чем для страны-инициатора, в том числе за счет возникновения неравенства в рамках региона, 2) санкции носят краткосрочный характер, 3) санкции многосторонние и вводятся под эгидой международных институтов, в том числе в рамках региональных торговых соглашений, 4) санкции направлены против демократических режимов. Кроме того, целевые санкции (смарт-санкции), позиционируемые как наиболее предпочитаемый тип санкций, не достигают целей чаще, чем традиционные комплексные санкции. Дальнейшие обзорные исследования могут быть связаны с целевыми экономическими санкциями (на примере, прежде всего, России) и включать в выборку публикации о применении таких санкций для отдельных стран и отраслей экономики.Библиографические ссылки
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