Relationship between Assets and Organizational Structure in the Oil Industry: Regional Aspects
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17059/2018-4-2Keywords:
assets, oil company, organizational structure, reserves, state regulation, oil industry, small and medium-sized business, oil and gas region, concentration ratioAbstract
The article analyzes the relationship between the assets of the oil industry and the industry organizational structure at the level of the producing regions. When considering assets in oil production, we focus on the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the resource base, primarily on the volumes of recoverable reserves and their depletion. The analysis of the organizational structure of the industry is based on the estimates of the concentration levels of companies in oil production. The performed analysis allows to conclude that in most of the Russian Federation subjects, the organizational structure of the oil industry does not correspond to the assets. For example, in a number of regions, there is a high concentration of companies with a high depletion of reserves. This situation is largely determined by a weak development of small and medium-sized oil business. The development of the organizational structure should be connected with the reform of the institutional conditions in resource management. Currently, these conditions are formed at the federal level and are outside the scope of the regional authorities. Resource base, primarily in mature oil and gas regions, requires stimulating the development of small and mediumsized oil business including support from the regional authorities. The study of regional aspects of the organizational structure of oil production allows identifying the characteristics of certain regions, dependencies and drivers that are not visible when considering these issues at the country level. The obtained results can be used for the development of the system of state regulation in the oil and gas sector both at the federal and regional levels.References
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 152.
Uilyamson, O. (1996). Ekonomicheskie instituty kapitalizma. Firmy, rynki, “otnoshencheskaya” kontraktatsiya [The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting]. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat Publ.; CEV Press, 702. (In Russ.)
Williamson, O. (2010). Transaction Cost Economics: The Origins. Journal of Retailing, 86(3), 227–231. DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2010.07.006.
Williamson, O. (2010). Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progress. Journal of Retailing, 86(3), 215–226. DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2010.07.005.
Williamson, O. & Winter, S. (Eds). (1993). The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Oxford: Oxford University press, 245.
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 479.
Joskow, P. (2008). Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design. Utilities Policy, 16(3), 159–170. DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2007.10.003.
Joskow, P. & Tirole, J. (2000). Transmission rights and market power on electric power networks. RAND Journal of Economics, 31(3), 450–487. Retrieved from: https://economics.mit.edu/files/1131.
Kryukov, V. A. & Tokarev, A. N. (2007). Neftegazovyye resursy v transformiruemoy ekonomike. O sootnoshenii realizovannoy i potentsialnoy obshchestvennoy tsennosti nedr. Teoriya, praktika, analiz i otsenka [Oil and gas resources in a transitional economy: comparing realized and potential social value of mineral wealth (theory, practice, analysis, and estimates)]. In: V. V. Kuleshov (Ed.). Novosibirsk: Nauka-Tsentr Publ., 588. (In Russ.)
Noreng, O. (2002). Crude Power. Politics and Oil Market. London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 254.
Kryukov, V. & Tokarev, A. (2018). Spatial Dynamics of the Oil and Gas Field Services Sector: Global Trends and Lessons for Russia. Regional Research of Russia, 8(3), 248–257. DOI: 10.1134/S2079970518030036.
Shearmur, R. (2010). Space, place and innovation: a distance-based approach. The Canadian Geographer, 54(1), 46–67. DOI: 10.1111/j.1541–0064.2009.00302.x.
The economic contribution of the onshore independent oil and natural gas producers to the U.S. Economy. (2011). USA: IHS Global Insight, 63.
Profile of independent producers. 2012–2013. (2013). USA: Independent petroleum association of America, 23.
Gosudarstvennyy doklad “O sostoyanii i ispolzovanii mineralno-syryevykh resursov RF v 2015 godu” [State report «On the state and use of mineral resources in the Russian Federation in 2015»]. (2016). Moscow: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of RF Publ., 344. (In Russ.)
Kryukov, V. & Moe, A. (2018). Does Russian unconventional oil have a future? Energy Policy, 119, 41–50. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.021.
Tremblay, V. & Tremblay, C. (2012). New Perspectives on Industrial Organization: With Contributions from Behavioral Economics and Game Theory. New York: Springer, 811.
Pavic, I., Galetic, F. & Piplica, D. (2016). Similarities and Differences between the CR and HHI as an Indicator of Market Concentration and Market Power. British Journal of Economics, Management & Trade, 13(1), 1–8.
Vyazovov, B. & Kozenyasheva, M. (2018). Nemalaya dolya [Not small share]. Neftegazovaya vertikal [Oil and Gas Vertical], 10, 64–71. (In Russ.)
Topalov, A. (2018). Kak pomoch nezavisimym? [How to help the independent?]. Neftegazovaya vertikal [Oil and Gas Vertical], 8, 60–63. (In Russ.)
Handscomb, C., Sharabura, S. & Woxholth, J. (2016). The oil and gas organization of the future. Five ideas can help organizations adapt as technological and political trends reshape the industry. McKinsey. Retrieved from: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/the-oil-and-gas-organization-of-the-future (date of access: 15.04.2018).
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2018 Valery Anatolyevich Kryukov, Anatoly Nikolaevich Tokarev
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
